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Abstract 
 
 
This study investigates the situation of Corporate Governance in China, and tries to 
find out the relation between Corporate Governance and firm performance of public-
listed firms on Chinese stock markets. The dataset comprises a panel of 13,553 firm-
year observations of Corporate Governance during the period of 1998-2008, and a 
panel of 15,396 firm-year observations of financial sheets from 1994-2008. These two 
panel data represent 1,575 A-share firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges in China.  
 
 
From this study we can see that the ownership of state-owned firms on Chinese stock 
markets are highly concentrated and these firms still play the roll as economic giants 
in China. On the other side, family firms grow fast from 1998 to 2008, and share more 
stocks with management compared with state-owned firms.  
Regressing Tobin’s q, the results show that the ownership concentration isn’t 
beneficial, indicating the entrenchment effect of ownership concentration on firm 
performance. This kind of negative influence is even more obvious in family firms, 
likely because of insider expropriation. Concerning the impact of managerial stock 
incentives on firm performance, regression results reveal that the shareholding of 
CEO and board chair both have greater effects on firm performance in family firms 
compared with non-family firms, which suggests that equity-based compensation has  
greater positive impact for family members in family firms since CEO and board chair 
of family firms are probably just family members.  
Regarding industry effects on firm performance, we find for family intensive 
industries, the shareholding of the largest shareholder has positive and significant 
impact on firm performance while this statement cannot hold for those industries in 
which the proportion of family firms is below the average.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 12 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 13 - 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This study investigates the situation of Corporate Governance in China, and tries to 
find out the relation between Corporate Governance and firm performance of public-
listed firms on Chinese stock markets. The hypotheses are based on literature about 
the impact of different Corporate Governance factors on firm performance. I basically 
focus on the issues like whether family ownership has significant effects on 
performance, how ownership concentration impacts firm performance, the relation 
between equity based managerial compensation and firm performance and the 
influence of duality of CEO and board chair. 
 
China is going through an era of economic boom, so it is on the stock markets. By 
now, a total of 1628 companies have gone public by the end of July 2009, and the 
volume of equity market capitalization totaled 23.57 trillion RMB (about 2.12 trillion 
Euro1), ranking the third place in the world. Despite the rapid growth, Corporate 
Governance is still very weak in China. Insider control and self-dealing are so 
rampant in China that made Chinese stock markets “a casino without rules”. 
The poor Corporate Governance in China has historical reasons. China has been 
undergoing a transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy,  
although related government agencies have issued various laws, rules, regulations, 
and standards aimed at laying the foundation for a sound Corporate Governance 
framework, Corporate Governance problems like concentrated state-ownership, 
insider trading or false fiscal disclosure are difficult to conquer in a short time.  
 
In this paper the relation between Corporate Governance variables and firm 
performance has been investigated using the data of China’s listed companies from 
1994 to 2008. Two measures of firm performance are used, namely Tobin’s q and 
return on assets (ROA). These are dependent variables. Explanatory variables are the 
family dummy variable, ownership concentration, restraint of ownership 
concentration, board size, shareholding of CEO, shareholding of board, shareholding 
of Board Chair, duality of CEO and Board Chair, debt to equity ratio, ln (total assets) 
                                                 
1 Calculated with exchange rate of Bank of Austria on 22nd March, 2010. 
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and sales growth. Results of regression to the two performance measures are very 
different, the very likely reason could be the insider expropriation on ROA in family-
controlled firms. 
Regression results of sub samples of family firms and non-family firms as well as 
different industrial firms are also shown in this study.  Taking sub samples of  family 
intensive industries including those above and below average level, using Tobin’s q as 
dependent variable, the regression is furthermore performed. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the literature on the relation 
between Corporate Governance and firm performance. Section 3  gives an overview 
on Corporate Governance in China. Section 4 describes the data and variables. 
Section 5  presents the main results. In Section 6 concludes the findings. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Researchers worldwide have already discussed the relation between family firm 
performance and Corporate Governance. In general, researchers held the view that the 
factors that influence family firm performance are basically industry, characteristics 
of the firm, Corporate Governance, managerial factors and personality of founder. 
Some of the Chinese researchers also did some valuable investigations in this area; 
they mainly focused on the impact of factors like shareholding structure, board of 
directors, managerial structure, contractual governance and relation governance, to the 
family firm performance. I divide these research points into five fields trying to 
connect to the factors investigated in this survey. 
 
 
 
2.1. State-Ownership and Firm Performance 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997)1 suggested that, in some situations where non-shareholder 
constituencies such as managers, employees, and consumers are left with too few 
benefits, and too little incentive to make relationship-specific investments, 
concentrated ownership is not optimal. In these situations, cooperatives might be a 
more efficient ownership structure. A similar argument is used to justify state 
ownership of firms. Where monopoly power, externalities, or distributional issues 
raise concerns, private profit-maximizing firms may fail to address these concerns.  
Nonetheless, the reality of state ownership is broadly inconsistent with this efficiency 
argument. From the view of Shleifer and Vishny, first, state firms do not appear to 
serve the public interest better than private firms do. Second, state firms are typically 
extremely inefficient, and their losses result in huge drains on their countries' 
treasuries.  
This view of Corporate Governance helps explain the principal elements of the 
behavior of state firms. While in theory these firms are controlled by the public, the de 
                                                 
1 Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1997) A survey of corporate governance, Journal of Finance 52(2), 737–783. 
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facto control rights belong to the bureaucrats. These bureaucrats can be thought of as 
having extremely concentrated control rights, but no significant cash flow rights 
because the cash flow ownership of state firms is effectively dispersed amongst the 
taxpayers of the country. State ownership is then an example of concentrated control 
with no cash flow rights and socially harmful objectives. Viewed from this 
perspective, the inefficiency of state firms is not at all surprising.  
The recognition of enormous inefficiency of state firms, and the pressures on public 
budgets, have created a common response around the world in the last few years, 
namely privatization. In most cases, privatization replaces political control with 
private control by outside investors. At the same time, privatization in most countries 
creates concentrated private cash flow ownership to go along with control. The result 
of the switch to these relatively more efficient ownership structures is typically a 
significant improvement in performance of privatized firms (Megginson et al., 19941; 
Lopez-de-Silanes, 19942). 
Megginson et al. survey pre and post-privatization operating performance of 61 
companies from 18 countries and 32 industries that experienced full or partial 
privatization during the period 1961 to 1990 and find that the mean and median 
profitability, real sales, operation efficiency, and capital investment spending all 
increase significantly after privatization. 
Likewise, Boardman and Vining (1989)3 find for the 500 largest non-US mining and 
manufacturing companies in 1983 that private corporations are both more profitable 
and more efficient than either completely or partially state-owned companies. 
Corroborating evidence is provided by Gorton and Schmidt (1996) for Germany, and 
Gugler (1998) for Austria. Other literature concerning the relation between family-
ownership and firm performance will be also introduced in the next part of this 
Section. 
 
There are also some researches about the influence of state-ownership to firm 
performance. Xu and Wang (1999)4 still support the inefficiency of state ownership. 
                                                 
1 Megginson, W., Nash, R.C, and Van Randerborgh. (1994), The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized 
Firms: An International Empirical Analysis, Journal of Finance 49, 403-452. 
2 Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. (1995)  Privatization in the United States,, Rand Journal of Economics 28. 
3 Boardman, A. E. and Vining,  A. R.(1989) Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the 
Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises.” Journal of Law and Economics, 32(1), 1–33. 
4 Xu, X.  and Wang, Y. (1999) Ownership structure and corporate governance in Chinese stock companies, China Economic 
Review 10 (1999) 75-98. 
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Sun et al. (2002)1, however, find a positive impact on partially privatised state-owned 
enterprises. But this relationship is non-linear and shows an inverted U-shape. They 
argue that too much government ownership is indeed bad for enterprises, but too little 
government ownership is either not good probably because of lack of political support 
and business connections. Le and Buck (2009)2 survey more than 1000 Chinese listed 
firms, 2003-2005, and find a positive association between state ownership and firm 
performance. From their perspective, state ownership in the Chinese context may 
represent a strategic asset rather than an agency burden.  
 
 
2.2. Family-Ownership and Firm Performance 
 
Economists in the past discussing the family shareholding and firm performance have 
divergence of views (Kirehhof and Kirchhof, 1987; Gorriz and Fumas, 1996; Wall 
1998; Palia and Lichtenberg, 1999;  Barth etc., 2005; Kim, 2006) 
Some researchers observe that family firms are more efficient than non-family firms. 
The reasons are firstly, the most important structural character of family firms is that 
the founder and his family keep the ownership and the management control, and the 
family will in most cases keep the control after generations. Therefore, some 
researchers believe that family control with long-term tenure and constant objectives 
can efficiently solve the problem of classic owner-manager conflict. 
Secondly, family organization in terms of incentives and monitoring, and the special 
roles of altruism and loyalty in the family and between family members are typical 
features of family firms. Pollack (1985) 3  and Coleman (1990) 4  stress that those 
features of family firms are beneficial for the flexibility of decision-making and 
simplicity of decision-making procedure, those features also restrict the related 
personnel to acquit their responsibilities. 
Furthermore, the pursuit of family reputation of the owner-controller, the relation and 
connection between families, are all factors that give family leadership long-term 
inspiration. All the factors mentioned above are beneficial for firm performance. 
                                                 
1 Sun, Q., Tong, J. and Tong, W. (2002) How Does Government Ownership Affect Firm Performance? Evidence from China's 
Privatization Experience, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting (29) 1-27. 
2 Le, T.V.  and Buck, T.(2009)  State ownership and listed firm performance: a universally negative governance relationship? 
Journal of Management and Governance, working paper 
3 Pollack, R.A.(1985) A Transaction cost approach to families and households Journal of Economic Literature(23) 581-608. 
4 Coleman, J.S. (1990)  Foundations of Social Theory Cambridge The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press . 
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Some empirical studies also support this viewpoint. Gorriz and Fumas (1996) 1  
investigate family firms in Spain, they choose return on net assets (RONA) and 
productivity as the index of firm performance. The results turn out that family firms 
have higher productivity but the profitability is not significantly higher. Through an 
empirical study on Chinese listed family firms, Deng and Gu (2007)2 show that, the 
productivity as well as the profitability of family firms surpass those of non-family 
firms in China. 
 
On the other side, there are other researchers who hold the contrary opinion. They 
document that the family firms have weaker performance.  
Firstly, there are internal conflicts in family firms. Especially during the period of 
market growth, the unclearness of the property rights will induce severe conflicts 
between family members, since they have different objectives and values. According 
to the research by Schulze (2003)3, ownership dispersion in family firms will separate 
the interest of the members who manage the firm and other family members. Since 
small shareholders within the family would choose to free ride through not taking 
responsibilities, asking for high return on even extra benefit etc. 
Secondly, concentrated ownership leads to more conservative attitude in financial risk 
and higher cost of capital (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985)4, as a result, family owners 
would be more prudential when new investment is invited. Besides, they don’t want to 
bear too much debt neither accept new investors (Agrawal and Nagarjan, 19905; Gallo 
and Vilaseca, 1996 6 ). This prudential policy will limit technology upgrade and 
therefore pull down performance. Using data of 506 family firms in Western New 
York, (holding all factors of production constant), Wall (1998)7 concludes that family 
firms in Western New York generate 18 percent less in sales on average than non-
family small firms. Thus within the small business sector, family firms contribute less 
                                                 
1 Gorriz ,C.G.and Fumas, V. S.(1996) Ownership Structure and Firm Performance -Some Empirical Evidence from Spain 
Managerial and Decision Economics(17) 575-586. 
2 Deng, D. and Gu, Q. (2007) Efficiency Evaluation and Improvement on China Family Public Firms, Research on Financial and 
Economic Issues 2007 (5) 42-47. 
3 Schulze, W. G. ,Lubatkin, M. H., and Dino, R. N.(2003) Exploring the Agency Consequences of Ownership Dispersion Among 
the Directors of Private Family Firms, Academy of Management Journal 46 (2)179-194. 
4 Demsetz, H. an d Lehn, K. (1985) The Structure of Corporate ownership :Causes and Consequences, Journal of political 
Economy(93) 1155-1177. 
5 Agrawal, A. and Nagarjan, N. J. (1990) Corporate Capital Structure, Agency Costs and Ownership Control: the Case of a1l 
Equity Firms, Journal of Finance(45) 1325-1331. 
6 Gallo, M. A.  and Vilaseca, A. (1996)  Finance in Family Business, Family Business Review(9) 387-401. 
7 Wall, A. R.(1998)  An Empirical Investigation of the Production Function of the Family Firm, Journal of Small Business 
Management(25) 24-32. 
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per firm than non-family small businesses to the production and income capabilities 
of the regional economy. Besides, some researchers suggest that family firms are 
effective substitution of institutional and market environment. Since the trust among 
family members can be regarded as the substitution of contract governance; family 
control  as the substitution of the protection on investors (Bellow, 20031; Burkart etc. 
20032). 
There are also some Chinese researchers who agree with this opinion, like 
Chen(1998)3 suggests, family corporation and company network are characteristics of 
Asian firm organization, which in some certain situations are more efficient and have 
competitive strength.  
 
In this study, with panel data of the Corporate Governance of Chinese listed 
companies from 1998 to 2008, searching for the relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance, I raise the hypothesis which follows the first 
viewpoint: 
Hypothesis 1: Family-owned firms have higher Tobin’s q on average than non-family 
firms in the last ten years on the Chinese stock markets .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Bellow, A. (2003) In Praise of Nepotism : A History of Family Enterprise from King David to George W .Bush , New York 
Anchor Books. 
2 Burkart, M., Panunzi, F. and Shleifer, A. (2003) Family Firms Journal of Finance(58) 2167-2202. 
3 Chen, L. (1998) Information Factors, Transaction Cost and Family Corporation Economic Research Journal 1998 (7). 
 - 20 - 
 
2.3.Shareholding Structure and Firm Performance 
 
The effect of ownership structure on Corporate Governance and furthermore on the 
value of firms have been researched extensively, with the role of large investors 
receiving special attention. There are basically two views: incentive and entrenchment 
effect of large shareholders. 
From the first perspective,  the most direct way to align cash flow and control rights 
of outside investors is to concentrate shareholdings. Some economists argue that 
concentration of shareholding or existence of large shareholders is good for 
management motivation, effective supervision and reduction of agency cost. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976)1 point out that outside managers are opportunists, so that the 
firm value is determined by the shareholding of inside shareholders.  
They think raising the shareholding of inside managers is beneficial to reduction of 
agency cost and is also good to conquer the dilemma of the separation of ownership 
and management. In the same way, Grossman and Hart (1980)2 point out that if the 
shareholding is highly dispersed, shareholders won’t have enough motivation to 
supervise outside managers. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988b)3 present evidence 
on the relationship between cash flow ownership of the largest shareholders and 
profitability of firms, taking Tobin’s q as dependent variable.  They use 371 Fortune 
500 firms for 1980 as a cross-section sample and find that q first rises as management 
ownership increases to 5%, then falls when ownership is from 5% to 25%, and rises 
again but slightly as ownership level goes higher. One interpretation of this finding is 
that, consistent with the role of incentives in reducing agency costs, performance 
improves with higher manager and large shareholder ownership at first. The 
achievement of Yeh Yin-hua (2005)4 supports the viewpoints as mentioned above. It 
shows that among the family firms in Taiwan, firms with concentrated shareholding 
perform better than those having lower levels of concentration. 
 
                                                 
1 Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976) Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, Journal 
of Financial Economics(3):  305-360. 
2 Grossman, S. J. , and Hart, O. D, (1980) Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem  and the Theory of the Corporation, Bell 
Journal of Economics (l1): 42-64. 
3 Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.(1988b), Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 
Journal of Financial Economics (20):293-315. 
4 Yeh, YH. (2005) Do Controlling Shareholders Enhance Corporate Value, Corporate Governance Vol.13(2): 313-325. 
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There is also a negative effect of the high levels of shareholding concentration, which 
is the entrenchment effect. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 1  point out although 
concentrated ownership makes large shareholders have more incentives to supervise 
the manager and the agency cost as well as the supervision cost will be reduced, they 
want also inefficiently redistributed wealth from other investors to themselves. They 
argue that as ownership gets beyond a certain point, the large owners gain nearly full 
control and are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate private benefits of 
control that are not shared by minority shareholders. Thus there are costs associated 
with high ownership and entrenchment, as well as with exceptionally dispersed 
ownership. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000)2  argue that concentrated shareholders 
take out private rents in terms of special dividends, while Claessens et al (2000)3 find 
that founding families can expropriate the interest of minority shareholders through 
excessive compensation schemes and related-party transactions. 
 
 
Empirical researchers in China don’t reach a united solution either. The research by Li 
(2005) 4  argues, firm value increases with the shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholder in Chinese family firms. The empirical study from the panel data of 
Shenzhen stock exchange from 1996 to 1999 by Chen and Xu (2001)5  shows that the 
shareholdings of the largest shareholder and firm performance (ROA, profit margin, 
RONA) are positively related, and the affect of ownership concentration on firm 
performance varies in different industries.  Wang and Zhou (2006) 6 shows that for 
start-up family firms, a negative correlation is found between the shareholdings of the 
largest shareholder and market value. Nevertheless the research by Jin and Jiao  
(2007) 7  indicates the correlation between shareholdings of largest shareholder of 
family firms and firm performance is insignificant. 
 
                                                 
1 Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W.(1997) A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance(52): 737-783. 
2 DeAngelo, H. and DeAngelo, L. (2000), Controlling Stockholders and the Disciplinary Role of Corporate Payout Policy: A 
study of the Times Mirror Company, Journal of Financial Economics (56): 153-207. 
3 Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L. ( 2000), The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations,  Journal 
of Financial Economics, (58): 81-112. 
4 Li, C.(2005)  Empirical Evidence of Influential Factors to Family Firms in China, Statistical Research 2005 (11) 
5 Xu, X. and Chen, X. (2003) Analysis of Influence of First Largest Shareholder to Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 
Economic Research Journal 2003(2) 
6 Wang, M. and Zhou, S.(2006), Types of Controlling Family, Double and Triple Agency and Firm Value, Management 
World2006(8). 
7 Jin, L. and Jiao, J. (2007), An Empirical Study of the Effect on Performance Generated by Shareholding Proportion of the 
Largest Shareholder of Family Business Technology Economics 2007(11):121-124. 
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In this study, I take the largest shareholding ratio as the measure of ownership 
concentration and try to find out how it relates to firm performance on Chinese stock 
market. 
 
 
2.4. Duality of CEO and Board Chair Influences Firm Performance 
 
Concerning the influence of leadership structure on firm performance, researchers 
have discussed this problem from the perspectives of agency cost and decision-
making process. The duality hypothesis says that there is a mechanism defect if 
leadership of firm is dual, meaning that CEO and chairman of board of directors is the 
same person; it will harm the independence of board of directors; the board will be 
controlled by managers and then they will gradually increase their rights; so 
separating the positions will reduce agency costs in corporations and improve 
performance. 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983)1  and Dalton and Kesner (1987)2  believe that the board 
controlled by managers cannot conduct legal governance functions. On the other side, 
Modern Stewardship Theory (Donaldson and Davis 1991)3 agues that, for CEOs who 
are stewards, their pro-organizational actions are best facilitated when the Corporate 
Governance structures give them high authority and discretion. Structurally, this 
situation is attained more readily if the CEO chairs the board of directors. Such a 
structure would be viewed as dysfunctional under the agency theory model. However, 
under the stewardship model, stewards maximize their utility as they achieve 
organizational rather than self-serving objectives. The CEO-chair is unambiguously 
responsible for the fate of the corporation and has the power to determine strategy 
without fear of any retractation by an outside chair of the board. 
Besides, the Resource-Based View argues the leadership structure should be decided 
by the environment firms are facing. An efficient board would consider whether the 
                                                 
1 Fama, E. and Jensen M.C. (1983) Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics(26): 301-325. 
2 Dalton,D.R. and Kesner,I.F.(1987) Composition and CEO Duality in Boards of Directors: An International Perspective, Journal 
of International Business Studies, (18): 33-42. 
3 Donaldson, L. and Davis, J.(1991) Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory, Australian Joumal of Management(16):49-64. 
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benefit from duality of board chair and CEO exceeds the potential cost of this 
structure (Brickley etc 1997)1. 
Yang(2007)2 raises the point that the advantage of immediate decision-making by 
relatively smaller family firms that have absolute authority would compensate their 
risk of subjective and one-sided decision; in contrast, for larger family firms with 
absolute authority, the risk of loss is hard to be made up by fast decision-making 
process, firm performance would be reduced; the empirical study by the author also 
proves this viewpoint.  
To sum up the above arguments, the influence of duality of board chair and CEO on 
firm performance is ambiguous. 
 
Therefore, I raise the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Duality of CEO and board chair has no influence on firm performance. 
 
 
2.5. Executive Compensation and Firm Performance 
 
There are basically three representative viewpoints on the effect of the executive 
compensation on firm performance.  
 
Firstly, some researchers document that executive compensation influences firm 
performance, although they prove this relation in different ways. 
After the survey of the executive compensation structure of 153 randomly-selected 
manufacturing firms in 1979–1980, Mehran (1995)3  provides evidence supporting 
advocates of incentive compensation, and also suggests that the form of compensation  
motivates managers more to increase firm value rather than the level of compensation. 
Firm performance is positively related to the percentage of equity held by managers 
and to the percentage of their compensation that is equity-based. He also finds that 
firms in which a higher percentage of the shares are held by insiders or outside block 
holders use less equity-based compensation. 
                                                 
1 Brickley,J., Coles, J. and Jarrell, G.(1997) Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board, Journal of 
Corporate Finance(3):189-220. 
2 Yang, L. (2007) Controlling Right Effects in Family Firms and Empirical Studies, Modern Management Science 2007(1): 84-86. 
3 Mehran, H. (1995) Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance  Journal of Financial Economics 
(38):163-184. 
 - 24 - 
Different from the monotonous relation of executive compensation and firm 
performance, McConnell and Servaes (1990) 1  find a significant curved relation 
between Tobin’s q and management ownership. A sample of 1,173 firms in 1976 and 
a sample of 1,093 firms in 1986 have been taken to investigate the cross-sectional 
relation between firm performance and management equity ownership. Their findings 
show that q increases firstly, and then decreases, as the management ownership gets 
more and more concentrated.  
 
Secondly, as opposite to the first view point: firm performance is a determinant of 
management ownership. Kole (1996)2 presents that there is a causality reversal in the 
relation of ownership and performance and this relation is more sensitive in research-
incentive firms. 
 
Third, executive compensation and firm performance are jointly determined. 
Chung and Pruitt (1996) 3  recognize that the firm’s Tobin’s q, executive stock 
ownership and executive compensation are jointly determined. Stock ownership and 
compensation are the mechanisms by which executives are bonded in order to act in 
the best interests of the shareholders. They find that CEO ownership and Tobin’s q are 
strongly positively correlated, which supports the joint hypothesis that firms with 
higher levels of intangible assets require higher levels of managerial ownership as a 
bonding mechanism, and at the same time firms with higher managerial ownership 
have higher market values. They also find a positive correlation between Tobin’s q 
and executive compensation, which they interpret as showing that it is optimal for 
firms with more intangible assets to attract (and pay more to) managers with higher 
talent. 
 
There is no identical view on this subject in China.  
Through an empirical study on the relation between the internal restriction to China’s 
enterprise managers’ behavior and enterprise operating performance, Gao (2001)4 
                                                 
1 McConnell, J., and H. Servaes (1990) Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, Journal of Financial 
Economics(27): 595-612. 
2 Kole,  S R.(1996) Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance: Incentive or Reward, Advance in Financial Economics, 
1996(2): l19-149. 
3 Chung, K.H., and S.W. Pruitt, (1996) Executive Ownership, Corporate Value and Executive Compensation: A uniting frame 
work. Journal of Banking and Finance 1996(10):1135-1159. 
4 Gao, M. On the Relativity Between the Internal Restriction to China’s Enterprise Managers, Behavior and Enterprise Operating 
Performance: A Case Study of Public Companies, Nankai Business Review 2001(5):6-13. 
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thinks the relation between them does not exist. This means the organic relations 
between the internal restriction to managers’ behavior and enterprise operating 
performance have not been established.  
Some researchers argue that there is a relation between executive compensation and 
firm performance.  
The study by Liu and Wang (2000)1 shows that the performance of listed companies 
is negatively related to the scale of state-ownership and salaries of managers.  Liu, 
Zhang and Zhang (2009)2 suggest that there exists a nonlinear relationship between 
senior management shareholding ratio and company operating performance; company 
scale obviously affects senior management shareholding and company operating 
performance. 
 
Based on the results showed above, I have the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Executive stock incentive and firm performance are significantly 
positively related. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1Liu, G. and Wang, J. Positive Analysis of Listed Companies: Equity Structures, Incentive Systems and Performances．
Economic Theory and Business Management 2000(5):41-45. 
2 Liu, Z.,  Zhang, J. and  Zhang, K.(2009) The Relationship Research between Equity Incentive and Operating Performance in 
Listed Companies. Journal of Shandong University of Science and Technology, 2009(2): 51-56. 
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3. Corporate Governance in China: 
 
3.1. China Economy  and Stock Market Boom 
 
Since China started its economic reform in the late 1970s, its gross domestic product 
has been growing at an average annual rate of 9.73 percent.  
 
 
Figure 1: China's Economic Growth 
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SOURCE: World Development Indicator, the World Bank Group (various years) 
 
Chinese stock markets have also been growing rapidly. China had opened its two 
stock markets, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) by the end of 1990. At that time, there were only eight issued stocks and the 
total market capitalization was a mere 260 million Chinese yuan (RMB). By the end 
of 1991, only 14 companies had gone public. However, the number of listed 
companies has grown 115 times bigger in 18 years. Especially since late 2005, when 
the share merger reform (gu quan fen zhi gai ge) started, Chinese stock markets have 
been going through a period of advance in development by leaps and bounds. This 
reform will gradually release previously non-tradable shares into the market and help 
 - 27 - 
improve the liquidity of the Chinese capital markets. By now, a total of 1628 
companies had gone public by the end of July 2009, and the volume of equity market 
capitalization totaled 23.57 trillion RMB, ranking the third place in the world, 
according to data released by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) on 
August 25th 2009. The volume of equity market capitalization by the end of July was 
equivalent to 95.4 percent of China's GDP in 2008. 1 
 
 
Figure 2: Market Capitalization of SSE and SZSE 
 
Source: Wind Data (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 By People's Daily Online China's equity market capitalization world's 3rd August 26, 2009 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90857/90859/6739534.htm 
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3.2. The Importance and Poor Performance of Corporate 
Governance in China 
 
Despite this rapid growth, Corporate Governance has been very weak in China. The 
World Economic Forum did a survey where China listed in 44th place out of 49 
studied countries concerning Corporate Governance (Liu, 2006). Insider manipulation 
and self-dealing are so wild in Chinese listed firms that a famous Chinese economist 
Wu Jinlian once called the Chinese stock markets in one of his books “a casino 
without rules.”1 
 
 
 
Table 1: Ranking of Corporate Governance Around the World (2003) 
 
SOURCE: LIU (2006) 
 
Although there is a perception that private entrepreneurs in China operate under 
incompetent checks and balances and lack transparent financial reporting, such weak 
Corporate Governance practices are contradictory with the fact that Chinese 
businessmen are not just seeking domestic leadership for their businesses but also 
                                                 
1 Wu, J. L., Modern Companies and Enterprise Reform, Tianjin, China: People Press, 1994. 
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setting their sights higher. They seek to become influential multinational companies. 
The International Financial Corporation (IFC) noted that a growing number of 
Chinese managers and entrepreneurs show willingness and desire to improve their 
Corporate Governance practices. They are becoming aware that a commitment to 
good Corporate Governance (i.e., well-defined shareholder rights, a solid control 
environment, high levels of transparency and disclosure, an empowered board of 
directors, etc.) makes a company more attractive to both investors and lenders and 
ultimately more profitable.1 
The mandate to improve the Corporate Governance of Chinese companies as part of 
the government’s efforts to develop financial markets has become a top priority for 
the Chinese national agenda. As a result, over the past few years, China has made 
significant strides on the Corporate Governance front. Related government agencies 
have issued various laws, rules, regulations, and standards aimed at laying the 
foundation for a sound Corporate Governance framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 China Corporate Governance Survey page1 
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3.3. Historical Evolution of Chinese Corporate Governance 
 
 
The historical Evolution of Chinese Corporate Governance has gone through four 
stages. 
 
The first stage is from 1949, the founding of People’s Republic of China, to the year 
of 1983. During this period,  the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominated in 
Chinese economy. The Government controlled nearly every economic sectors. 
Western thoughts of Corporate Governance was not introduced into any Chinese 
company yet. 
 
The second stage is from 1984 to 1993,  the main target of this period is the separation 
of government and enterprise in China. In October 1984, the Communist announced 
the decisions of the Central Committee on Economic Structural Reform, marking the 
beginning of enterprise reform. The reform was not intended to change the state’s 
ownership, but rather to remedy the inefficiency of SOEs. At this stage, China 
established the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE). In addition, in October 1992, the State Council Securities Commission and 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) were set up. This marks the 
reunification of China's securities market regulatory systems. State Council Securities 
Commission is the government body of the macro-management of a unified stock 
markets. China Securities Regulatory Commission is the instrumentality of the State 
Council Securities Committee and it supervises the securities market in accordance 
with laws and regulations. 
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Figure 3: China's Industrial Output, by Ownership, in 1985 
 
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics of People of Republic of China (2008) 
 
The third stage is from 1994 to 2005, during this period, the modern enterprise 
management system in China began to build up experimentally. The first Company 
Law was passed, which was the first law that detailed the responsibility and the 
authority of modern Chinese corporations. Although this Company Law had a 
significant influence on the evolution of Corporate Governance in China, the 
Government shareholders still enjoy more interests than individual shareholders. 
 
The final stage is from 2006 until now. Corporate Governance in China has 
undergone continuous development and progress. A series of laws and regulations 
were introduced, focusing on the balance of right and power between the Government 
and individual shareholders. 
 
Most of the studies on Corporate Governance in China focus on the protection of 
investors’ interest. As China is transiting from a centrally planned to a market-based 
economy, privatizing state enterprises and granting property rights to individuals have 
been the key elements of economic reform. Prior to the early 1980s, individuals used 
to have no ownership in state enterprises, and their compensations were not linked 
with companies’ performance. As a product of the reforms, especially after the 
establishment of Chinese capital markets, individual and families are gradually 
gaining property rights and becoming investors in companies. However, China is still 
working to build up its market economy, and individual investors’ interest is poorly 
protected and often expropriated by controlling shareholders and management. A 
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well-known Chinese economist defines Corporate Governance as the relationship 
among owners, boards of directors, and management, and stresses the checks and 
balances on control and incentives (Wu, 1994). 
 
3.4. Problems of Corporate Governance in China1 
 
Despite a series of recent reforms in Corporate Governance controls and institutions 
in China, there exist still a number of problems.  
First, the  concentration of state ownership. About 70% of companies listed in the 
SSE and SZSE are still state-owned enterprises, in forms of direct government body 
or through a brokerage firm, which is not efficient in capital allocation. 
Second, the board of directors lack independence. This problem is the immediate  
result of state ownership concentration. Since the Government still holds the 
dominance  over the board of directors in SOEs, the supervisory board has an 
insignificant impact on Corporate Governance. 
Third, insider trading is a very serious problem in Corporate Governance in China. 
This problem is due to the traditional enterprise culture, the hiding ability of insider 
trading, highly concentrated ownership, lack of securities laws and etc. Insider trading 
have interfered the normal trading order and seriously infringed on the benefits of 
small and medium investors. 
Fourth,  the nonstandard exposure of trading information and the incorrect disclosures 
of financial situation by companies. According to a random check by the Ministry of 
Finance, about 98.7% of Chinese companies overstated their earnings in annual 
reports in 20012. 
Last but not least, the immaturity of capital markets in China. Chinese banks still treat 
SOEs and other kind of firms unequally. Issuing corporate bonds  is problematic for 
companies and the preferred shares are still absent in Chinese domestic stock markets3. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Kang, Y., Shi, L., Brown, E. D.(2008) Chinese Corporate Governance - History and Institutional Framework 
2 http://www.zaobao.com/stock/pages7/china240501.html 
3 China’s Company Law which is revised in 2005 increased possibilities for the adoption of a “preferred stock” structure. 
However, there is no explicit two-class stock structure under China’s corporate law regime. And  private domestic companies are 
disallowed to issue preferred shares.  
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3.5. Institutional Roles of Corporate Governance in China 
 
There are many entities that play important roles in shaping companies’ behaviors in 
China. They can be roughly categorized into two main groups: those operating inside 
the company, and those operating outside the company. 
The group of entities which operates inside the company consists of the shareholders’ 
general meeting, boards, and management. All three are engaged in the operation of 
the company and are directly responsible for its governance. Outside the company are 
regulators (main player of which is CSRC), stock exchanges (which is composed of 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange), the legal system, the 
auditing system, and institutional investors. 
These external players mentioned above have a considerable influence on companies’ 
Corporate Governance, and they mainly function through conventions, Company 
Law, certification of financial reports, etc. Besides these institutional organizations 
and systems, there are other agents that also have an effect on Corporate Governance, 
for instance, customers, suppliers, employee committees, the press, and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 
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4. Sample and variables 
 
4.1. Sample 
 
The sample of this research comprises a panel of 13,553 firm-year observations 
during the period of 1998-2008, for which the ownership and financial data needed 
for the analysis are available, and the other panel of 15,396 firm-year observations of 
financial sheets from 1994-2008. These two panel data represent 1,575 A-share firms 
listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in China. A share on Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges refers to those that are traded in Renminbi, the 
currency in mainland China.  
 
Financial data and Corporate Governance data for the research are obtained from  
China Center for Economic Research (CCER), which is one of the leading data 
providers in China, which collects financial and Corporate Governance information 
from company annual reports as well as from the Chinese stock exchanges. 
 
Since 2007, listed firms are asked by the China Security Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC, the stock market’s regulatory authority) to disclose information about their 
ultimate controllers. Before the enactment of this regulation, ultimate controllers were 
difficult to identify because of lack of transparency. Thanks to the disclosure of the 
ultimate controller of firms, we can get a clear overview of the distribution of 
different types of firms. There are all in all six different types of firms categorized. 
The weights of each type of firm for the ten years and for each year are shown as 
follows in Table 2 and Table 3. We can see that state-owned firms take about three-
fourth of all the 12804 observations, which disclose their ultimate controllers. In the 
early years like late 1990th, this percentage is even larger, in 1998 it is almost 90%. 
Nevertheless this percentage decreases over years and the openness of the stock 
market. In 2008, this ratio is 60%. In contrary, the type of family-owned firms takes 
the second place in all samples and also in each year. From the data we can see the 
incomparably growth of family firms – the ratio increases steadily all the way from 
6% in 1998 to 37% in 2008. 
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Table 2: The Frequency of Types of Ultimate Controller From 1998-2008 
Type Freq. Percent Cum. 
    
0.State-owned 9,098 71.06 71.06 
1.Family-owned 3,028 23.65 94.70 
2.Foreign owned 106 0.83 95.53 
3.Collective owned 245 1.91 97.45 
4.Social organization 70 0.55 97.99 
5.Employee controlled 95 0.74 98.73 
6.Not to recognize 162 1.27 100.00 
Total 12,804 100.00  
*Types of ultimate controller are the types of the largest shareholder of the firm. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: The Frequency of Types of Ultimate Controller Each Year From 1998-2008 
Type of Ultimate Controller 
Year State-owned Family-owned Foreign founded Collective owned Social organization Employee controlled Not to recognize Total
1998 71 5 0 2 1 0 2 81
87.65 6.17 0 2.47 1.23 0 2.47 100.00 
1999 763 67 9 31 8 7 32 917
83.21 9.12 0.98 3.38 0.87 0.76 3.49 100.00 
2000 863 96 9 33 7 8 37 1,053
81.96 9.12 0.85 3.13 0.66 0.76 3.51 100.00 
2001 920 120 8 33 6 8 35 1,13
81.42 10.62 0.71 2.92 0.53 0.71 3.10 100.00 
2002 923 184 10 28 5 7 35 1,192
77.43 15.44 0.84 2.35 0.42 0.59 3.10 100.00 
2003 917 270 8 28 7 8 11 1,249
73.42 21.62 0.64 2.24 0.56 0.64 0.88 100.00 
2004 928 351 7 23 20 12 2 1,343
69.10 26.14 0.52 1.71 1.49 0.89 0.15 100.00 
2005 928 372 6 17 5 13 1 1,342
69.15 27.72 0.45 1.27 0.37 0.97 0.07 100.00 
2006 918 454 7 18 5 15 4 1,421
64.60 31.95 0.49 1.27 0.35 1.06 0.28 100.00 
2007 919 530 10 28 4 13 1 1,505
61.06 35.22 0.66 1.86 0.27 0.86 0.07 100,00 
2008 948 579 32 4 2 4 2 1,571
60.34 36.86 2.04 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.13 100.00 
Total 9,098 3,028 106 245 70 95 162 12,804
71.06 23.65 0.83 1.91 0.55 0.74 1.27 100.00 
 
 
 - 36 - 
4.2. Variables 
 
Table 4 introduces all the variables going to be used in the analyses. 
 
Table 4: Descriptions of All the Variables Used in the Analyses 
Variable  Description 
Family-controlled firm Since 2007,listed firms are asked by the China Security 
Regulatory Commission (the stock market’s regulatory 
authority) to disclose information about their ultimate 
controllers. Before the enactment of this regular, ultimate 
controllers were difficult to identify because of lack of 
transparency. This so-called ultimate controller is actually 
the type of the largest shareholder. In this survey family firm 
is a dummy variable. 1-family firm, 0-non-family firm. 
Source:CCER. 
State-controlled firm The same way to identify as family firms, the ultimate 
controller is Chinese Government. They are either directly 
controlled or through a brokerage firm. 
ROA Return on assets. Computed as net income over average of 
total assets at the beginning and at the end of year. 
Source:CCER. 
Total assets The sum of current and long-term assets owned by the 
company. Source:CCER 
Tobin's q Ratio of the market value of a company's stock with the 
value of a company's equity book value. Since Chinese 
situation is more complicated, because of the non-tradable 
shares in the past, Tobin's q value here is calculated as 
(tradable market value+ non-tradable share value+ current 
debt+long-term debt)/total assets. Source: CCER 
Sales growth Growth rate of sales. The difference of revenue of this year 
and revenue of last year, divided by last year's revenue. 
Source: CCER 
Ln(total assets) Natural logarithm of total assets. Source: CCER 
Ownership concentration Shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder of the firm. 
Source: CCER 
Restraint of ownership  
concentration 
Sum of the second to tenth largest shareholding ratios 
divided by the largest shareholding ratio. Source: CCER 
Board size Number of people on the board of directors of the firm. 
Source: CCER 
Shareholding of CEO Shareholding ratio of the CEO of the firm. Source: CCER 
Shareholding of board Shareholding ratio of board of directors of the firm. Source: 
CCER 
Shareholding of board 
Chair 
Shareholding ratio of the chairman of the board of directors 
of the firm. Source: CCER 
Duality Dummy variable, whether CEO and chairman or vice-
chairman of board of directors is the same person. Yes-1, no-
0. Source: CCER 
Debt to equity ratio Ratio of the sum of long-term Debt and current debt to total 
book value of equity. Source: CCER 
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Two measures of firm performance are used, namely Tobin’s q and return on assets 
(ROA). These are the dependent variables. Explanatory variables are the family 
dummy variable, ownership concentration, restraint of ownership concentration, board 
size, shareholding of CEO, shareholding of board, shareholding of Board Chair, 
duality of CEO and Board Chair, debt to equity ratio, ln (total assets) and sales growth.  
The effects of different industries, family intensiveness are also checked in the 
regressions which will be presented later on. 
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5. Main Result 
 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the whole sample, divided by family firms 
and non-family firms. Observations are firm-year data. 
 
5.1.1 Measures of firm performance 
 
Since the Tobin’s q displays a large kurtosis and is also highly skewed, to reduce the 
weight of extreme values, I cap Tobin’s q at the 1st  and 99th percentiles, so that the 
range of Tobin’s q is from 0.4 to 10. Average Tobin’s q of family firms is 1.54, which 
is 0.27 higher than for non-family firms, and the difference is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Family firms outperformed non-family firms in the period of 1998 to 
2008 if Tobin’s q is taken as the metric of firm performance, which supports the first 
hypothesis I raised:  Family-owned firms have higher Tobin’s q on average than non-
family firms in the last ten years on the Chinese stock markets. This result also 
coincides with the findings by Anderson and Reed (2003) and Villalonga and Amit 
(2004). Actually, Tobin’s q is not widely used among Chinese researchers, because on 
the one side, it is hard to calculate the replacement value of firms, and on the other 
side, the stock market efficiency is still not high which gives rise to Tobin’s q 
exaggeration on Chinese stock markets.  
The other measure of firm performance I choose is ROA (return on asset), computed 
as net income over average of total assets at the beginning and at the end of year - I 
also set the first and the last percentile as outliers - is more popular among Chinese 
stock analysts. Family firms’ ROA is two percentage points lower than this measure 
of non-family firms. The t test also shows that the difference is statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  
Both Tobin’s q and ROA are measures of firm performance but from different 
perspectives. Tobin’s q shows the market expectations on the company, while ROA 
reflects how profitable a company is relative to its total assets. Tobin’s q is widely 
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used as the firm performance measure for international Corporate Governance 
research, while Chinese economists prefer ROA. 
 
Tobin’s q ratio is not statistically related to past profitability - proxied by ROA, the 
reasons may on one hand because family firms have better reputation on Corporate 
Governance transparency in China, investors have more market expectations of future 
profitability on family firms and on the other side, family firms have incentives for 
monitoring expropriation, which leads to lower level of profitability represented by 
ROA. 
 
In this study, I choose both Tobin’s q and ROA to see how listed firms perform and 
try to find out how Corporate Governance variables influence these two performance 
measures separately. 
 
In terms of economic magnitude, the most significant difference can be shown in total 
assets: family fims’ assets average 1.65 billion Yuan, while non-family firms average 
4.43 billion Yuan – almost three times larger. If we take a look into history, we can 
see that the difference is more striking in the early years. Obviously the largest 
companies in the country still remain under state control.  
In contrast to economic magnitude, both the sales and asset growth rates of non-
family firms are lower than those of family firms, although the differences are not 
statistically significant.  
The average debt to equity ratio of family firms is higher than that of non-family firms. 
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Table 5: Family and Non-Family Firms: Descriptive Statistics 
Means, standard deviations, and tests of differences in means between family and non-family firms in their firm performance variables, 
financial characteristics and corporate governance variables. T-test is used to test the hypothesis that their means are equal. Family firms are 
defined as those their ultimate controller disclosed are families or private persons. The sample comprises a panel of 13,553 firm-year 
observations of Corporate Governance during the period of 1998-2008, for which the ownership and financial data needed for the analysis are 
available, and the other panel of 15,396 firm-year observations of financial sheets from 1994-2008. These two panel data represent 1,575 A-
share firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in China. Asterisks denote statistical significance at1%(***),5%(**) or 
10%(*) level, respectively. 
  (a)family firms (b)non-family firms ( c)all firms Diff. In Means 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. (a)-(b) t-stat. 
            
Tobin's q 2958 1.54 1.03 9699 1.27 0.72 15218 1.29 0.77 0.27 15.95*** 
ROA 2939 0.01 0.07 9699 0.03 0.06 15106 0.03 0.07 -0.01 -8.32*** 
Total assets(RMB billion) 3027 1.65 2.37 9776 4.43 24.70 15395 3.35 19.80 -2.77 -6.17*** 
Ln(assets) 3027 20.74 1.00 9776 21.29 1.07 15395 21.04 1.09 -0.55 -25.04*** 
Asset growth 2881 0.16 0.83 9272 0.15 0.60 14085 0.16 0.63 0.00 0.25 
Sales growth 2976 0.21 0.77 9694 0.19 0.60 15179 0.18 0.70 0.02 1.46 
Debt to equity ratio 2909 1.21 1.38 9610 1.15 1.13 15103 1.12 1.14 0.06 2.51** 
            
Ownership concentration 2860 0.32 0.14 9304 0.44 0.17 12911 0.41 0.17 -0.11 32.87*** 
Restraint of ownership 
concentration 
2860 0.97 0.74 9304 0.54 0.61 12911 0.65 0.67 0,44 32.07*** 
Shareholding of CEO 3009 0.01 0.06 9750 0,0004 0.01 13511 0.00 0.03 0..01 22.64*** 
Board size 3027 6 2 9769 7 2 13553 7 2 -1 -27.27*** 
Shareholding of board 3009 0.05 0.14 9750 0.0012 0.01 13511 0.01 0.07 0.05 34.82*** 
Shareholding of chairman 3009 0.03 0.09 9750 0.0005 0.01 13511 0.01 0.04 0.03 31.86*** 
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5.1.2 Corporate Governance variables 
 
Besides some data describing the performance and development of firms, there are 
also some variables which show the basic Corporate Governance situation of all 
sample firms.  
The variable of shareholding concentration represents the shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder. For both types of family and non-family firms, the largest shareholder 
owns over one-third of total shares. Since in China, one-share-one-vote rule is 
required by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 1 , the largest 
shareholders of Chinese listed companies have considerably large control right on 
their firms. The largest shareholders of non-family firms – most of which are state-
controlled firms – have on average  higher shareholdings (44%) than family firms 
(32%), showing that ownership is more concentrated in non-family firms than in 
family firms (Figure 4). The Chinese government is still grasping economic lifeline of 
the country. 
 
Figure 4: Histogram Graphs of Ownership Concentration  
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Accordingly, another variable, restraint of ownership concentration, which is 
computed as the sum of the second to tenth largest shareholding ratios over the largest 
shareholding ratio, is profoundly different between family and non-family firms. For 
family-controlled firms, this restraint ratio is 0.97, and for non-family controlled firms 
is 0.54. This result indicates that the balance mechanism of family firms is more 
effective than non-family firms. The other large shareholders still have equivalent 
                                                 
1 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China chapter1 (1) 
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shareholding power against the largest shareholder in family-firms, while for state-
controlled firms, the other large shareholders have only half of the control rights  
compared with the largest shareholder, which is most often the Chinese Government. 
 
Another variable, board size, shows how many members are there on the board of 
directors. Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that large boards can 
be less effective than small boards. The idea is that when boards become too big, 
agency problems (such as director free-riding) increase within the board and the board 
becomes more symbolic and less a part of the monitoring process. There are also 
some researchers who tested this view empirically and supported it. In general, it is a 
fairly clear picture: board size and firm value are negatively correlated. 
However, most of the studies are based on U.S. or European scenarios, where the 
board is generally larger than in China. For family firms there are 6 board members 
and for non-family firms 7. In comparison, Wu(2004)1 takes 350 sample firms from 
1988 to 1995 in the U.S. and finds that the average board size decreased from 12 in 
the 1980s to 11 in the 1990s; Kang and Shivdasani (1995)2  use a sample which 
consists of 270 non-financial Japanese firms in Moody’s International Manual as of 
fiscal year-end 1984 and the average board size is about 25.  
Executive compensation is another Corporate Governance issue. In this study, I don’t 
choose  salary compensation but the insider ownership like shareholding ratio of 
CEO, board and board chair as the indexes of  equity incentives. Interestingly, the 
difference between family firms and non-family firms in those variables is quite 
notable. For non-family firms – mostly state-controlled firms – the average 
shareholding of CEO, board and board chair are all very small (I reserve four digits 
after the decimal point for accuracy), meaning that the management of state-owned 
firms can seldomly enjoy the ownership with the government but only the control 
rights and pay compensation. In contrary, family firms share more ownership rights 
with the management, especially with the board chair. It could be that in family firms, 
the management is just family member(s) and also the largest shareholder(s).  From 
this sample I also find out that the salary of management of state-controlled firms is 
on average much higher than that of family firms.  
                                                 
1 Wu Y. The impact of public opinion on board structure changes, director career progression, and CEO turnover: evidence from 
CalPERS’ corporate governance program Journal of Corporate Finance 10 (2004) 199– 227 
2 J.-K. Kang, A. Shivdasani. Firm performance, corporate governance, and top  executive turnover in Japan Journal of Financial 
Economics 38 (1995) 29-58 
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For all the Corporate Governance variables, the differences of the means between 
family and non-family firms statistically significant are at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
5.1.3 Industry distribution 
 
Table 6 shows the industry distribution of family firms. Although family firms are 
now very active in all sectors of the economy in China, they are not uniformly 
distributed across industries. There are all in all 61 six-digit GICS industries in the 
sample, 5 six-digit GICS code industries in which there are no family firms 
(Aerospace & Defense, Airlines, Consumer Finance, Diversified Telecommunication 
Services and Gas Utilities), 15 in which family firms have a smaller than 10%  share, 
3 in which family firms have more than 50% share (Software, Office Electronics and 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment). 
These differences suggest that it is important to take industry effects into account in 
the later analyses. 
 
Table 6: Number and Percent of Firm-Year by Six-Digit GICS Code 
GICS Code Industry definition Family firms All firms 
Family firms 
in industry 
101010 Energy Equipment & Services 7 24 0.29 
101020 Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels 22 248 0.08 
101030 Oil & Gas Refining & Marketing 4 56 0.07 
151010 Chemicals 235 1453 0.16 
151020 Construction Materials 37 304 0.12 
151030 Containers & Packaging 26 70 0.37 
151040 Metals & Mining 88 855 0.1 
151050 Paper & Forest Products 47 275 0.17 
201010 Aerospace & Defense 0 72 0 
201020 Building Products 40 162 0.24 
201030 Construction & Engineering 40 241 0.16 
201040 Electrical Equipment 114 389 0.29 
201050 Industrial Conglomerates 65 344 0.18 
201060 Machinery 180 1025 0.17 
201070 Trading Companies & Distributors 52 274 0.18 
202010 Commercial Services & Supplies 40 148 0.27 
203010 Air Freight & Logistics 14 39 0.35 
203020 Airlines 0 42                      0 
203030 Marine 3 104 0.02 
203040 Road & Rail 4 116 0.03 
203050 Transportation Infrastructure 24 354 0.06 
251010 Auto Components 61 346 0.17 
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251020 Automobiles 40 310 0.12 
252010 Household Durables 118 441 0.26 
252020 Leisure Equipment & Products 11 73 0.15 
252030 Textiles, Apparel & Luxury Goods 192 668 0.28 
253010 Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure 37 285 0.12 
253020 Diversified Consumer Services 12 26 0.46 
254010 Media 17 126 0.13 
255010 Distributors 90 460 0.19 
255030 Multiline Retail 37 502 0.07 
255040 Specialty Retail 18 39 0.46 
301010 Food & Staples Retailing 16 126 0.12 
302010 Beverages 53 289 0.18 
302020 Food Products 130 596 0.21 
303010 Household Products 5 50 0.1 
303020 Personal Products 9 20 0.45 
351010 Health Care Equipment & Supplies 13 61 0.21 
351020 Health Care Providers & Services 8 48 0.16 
352010 Biotechnology 34 81 0.41 
352020 Pharmaceuticals 270 864 0.31 
402010 Diversified Financial Services 1 8 0.12 
402020 Consumer Finance 0 9 0 
402030 Capital Markets 1 2 0.5 
404030 Real Estate Management & Development 267 1005 0.26 
451010 Internet Software & Services 7 7 1 
451020 IT Services 37 139 0.26 
451030 Software 103 165 0.62 
452010 Communications Equipment 107 412 0.25 
452020 Computers & Peripherals 52 229 0.22 
452030 Electronic Equipment & Instruments 134 502 0.26 
452040 Office Electronics 3 5 0.6 
452050 
Semiconductor Equipment & Products -- 
Discontinued effective 04/30/2003. 17 80 0.21 
453010 Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 9 13 0.69 
501010 Diversified Telecommunication Services 0 3 0 
501020 Wireless Telecommunication Services 4 12 0.33 
551010 Electric Utilities 26 476 0.05 
551020 Gas Utilities 0 29 0 
551030 Multi-Utilities 4 57 0.07 
551040 Water Utilities 7 72 0.09 
551050 
Independent Power Producers & Energy 
Traders 1 25 0.04 
 Not to recognized 35 140 0.25 
     
 Total 3028 15396 0.19 
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5.2. Relation Between Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance 
 
5.2.1 Correlations of variables 
 
Table 7 shows the correlation matrix for the sample used here. The negative and 
significant correlation between ROA and Tobin’s q should be noted. 
As explained before in descriptive statistics, ROA and Tobin’s q are measures for 
firm performance from different perspectives. ROA shows how efficiently a company 
can squeeze profit from its assets. A high ROA is a sign of solid financial and 
operational performance, whereas the value of  Tobin’s q demonstrates the market 
expectations of investors on future profits. ROA and Tobin’s q are in most studies 
positively correlated.  
The correlations between shareholding of CEO and shareholding of board and board 
chair are both high. It seems that CEO has a successful bargaining position about their 
ownership rights of the firm if the board itself has equity ownership of this firm.  
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix 
 Tobin’s q ROA Ln(assets) Sales growth
Debt to equity 
ratio
Ownership 
concentration
Restraint of 
ownership 
concentration
Shareholding 
of CEO Board size
Shareholding 
of board
Shareholding 
of chairman Duality
  
Tobin’s q 1.0000 
ROA -0.0775* 1.0000 
Ln(assets) -0.2903* 0.0178* 1.0000
Sales growth -0.0125 0.1175* 0.1181* 1.0000 
Debt to equity ratio -0.0907* -0.3099* 0.2245* 0.0719* 1.0000 
Ownership concentration -0.2310* 0.1990* 0.2008* 0.0350* -0.0666* 1.0000
Restraint of ownership concentration 0.1526* -0.0766* -0.1713* -0.0156 0.0179* -0.7367* 1.0000 
Shareholding of CEO 0.0403* 0.0189* -0.0621* -0.0062 -0.0495* -0.0670* 0.1500* 1.0000
Board size -0.0417* 0.1189* 0.0329* -0.0115 -0.0382* 0.0888* -0.0329* -0.0814* 1.0000 
Shareholding of board 0.0337* 0.0461* -0.0710* 0.0161 -0.0522* -0.1028* 0.2102* 0.6931* -0.1085* 1.0000
Shareholding of chairman 0.0423* 0.0357* -0.0608* 0.0183* -0.0424* -0.0738* 0.1453* 0.6405* -0.1102* 0.9079* 1.0000
Duality 0.0106 0.0046 -0.0048 -0.0095 -0.0099 -0.0239* 0.0143 -0.0032 -0.0303* 0.0052 0.0038 1.0000 
Asterisk denotes statistical significance at 5% and less. 
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5.2.2 Regression results 
 
In this section, the relationship between firm performance and Corporate Governance 
is analyzed.  
In Table 8, Tobin’s q and ROA are separately analyzed as dependent variables, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, firm fixed effects regression, and two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) regression are performed.  
Taking Tobin’s q as performance metric, the family ownership dummy variable, in 
the first three columns, presents positive results (0.08, 0.07, 0.41), and shows that 
family firms significantly  outperform the firms controlled by other types of owners, 
the coefficient is even higher especially using an instrumental-variables 2SLS model1. 
The results provide evidence on the benefits of family control compared to control by 
non-family owners, plausibly due to lower agency costs, in family firms on Chinese 
stock markets. When ROA is the performance metric (column 4 to column 6), family 
ownership doesn’t generate higher performance and the coefficients are slightly lower 
than zero (-0.00, -0.00, -0.01), and the levels of significance of the results are not very 
high. As explained before, Tobin’s q and ROA represent firm performance in 
different ways, and are also influenced by different micro- and macro-environmental 
factors.  
The effects of ownership concentration and restraint of ownership concentration to 
Tobin’s q are both significantly negative (-0.91, -1.92, -0.79). Ownership 
concentration defined as the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder cannot 
improve the market expectations of firms and neither can the restraint of ownership 
concentration (-0.06, -0.20, -0.08) computed as the sum of the second to tenth largest 
shareholding over the largest. When ROA is the dependent variable, on the contrary, 
both the ownership concentration and the restraint of ownership concentration show 
positive effects(0.07, 0.11, 0.07; 0.01, 0.01, 0.01).  
Concerning managerial ownership, the shareholding of CEO and board chair show 
positive influences on Tobin’s q (0,71, 0.34, 0.79; 1.34, 3.83, 1.20),  whereas negative 
effects on ROA (-0.06, -0.05, -0.06; -0.04, -0.30, -0.03), the results are significant, 
                                                 
1 Instrumented variable is family ownership dummy, instrument variables are ownership concentration, restraint of ownership 
concentration, shareholding of CEO, shareholding of board, shareholding of board chair, board size, duality, debt to equity ratio, 
log of total assets, sales growth and industry dummies. 
 - 48 - 
supporting the hypothesis 3: Executive stock incentive and firm performance have 
statistically significant relation. The variable board size of firms improve firm 
performance slightly both for Tobin’s q and ROA (0.01, 0.02, 0.02; 0.00, 0.00, 0.00). 
This result is contrary to some studies (Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) ), 
likely because the board size in Chinese firms is on average – only 7 people –  much 
smaller than in USA or Japan, which are hotly discussed among researchers. So that 
the results of the correlation between board size and firm performance are then not 
comparable. 
The duality of CEO and board chair has very small positive effect on Tobin’s q (0.02, 
0.03, 0.02) and ROA (0.00, 0,00, 0.00) but not statistically significant, which supports 
the hypothesis 2: duality of CEO and board chair has no influence on firm 
performance. 
Debt to equity ratio and log of total assets both have significantly negative 
relationship with dependent variables Tobin’s q and ROA, in contrast, sales growth is 
positively related to q and ROA, though the results of the regression to Tobin’s q are 
not significant. 
The models’ fit – presented by adjusted R-squared – of the firm fixed effects 
regression is the best of these three regressions (0.35; 0.33).  
 
 
Table 8: Regression Results 1 
Regression results of Tobin’s q and ROA on family ownership, ownership 
concentration and other Corporate Governance variables. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at 1%(***), 5%(**), or 10%(*) level, respectively. 
 
 Tobin's q ROA 
  OLS Fixed Effects 2SLS OLS Fixed Effects 2SLS 
 OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Family ownership dummy 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.41*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.01*
 (4.74) (2.87) (4.76) (-0.59) (-0.28) (-1.75)
Ownership concentration -0.91*** -1.92*** -0.79*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.07***
 (-15.65) (-17.78) (-11.73) (16.46) (13.18) (13.74)
Restraint of ownership concentration -0.06*** -0.20*** -0.08*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
 (-3.98) (-8.11) (-4.87) (8.90) (6.49) (8.97)
Shareholding of CEO 0.71** 0.34 0.79*** -0.06* -0.05 -0.06***
 (2.29) (0.57) (2.48) (-2.38) (-1.00) (-2.47)
Shareholding of board -1.14*** -3.21*** -1.55*** 0,08*** 0,30 0,09***
 (-4.87) (-5.63) (-5.95) (4.43) (6.47) (4.71)
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Shareholding of board chair 1.34*** 3.83*** 1.20*** -0.04* -0.30 -0.03
 (3.95) (3.83) (3.48) (-1.48) (-3.73) (-1.30)
Board size 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
 (3.71) (5.33) (5.33) (7.90) (7.69) (4.63)
Duality 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.71) (1.26) (0.95) (1.45) (1.66) (1.35)
Debt to equity ratio -0.04*** -0.05 -0.04 -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02***
 (-6.53) (-7.46) (-7.24) (-36.10) (-22.45) (-33.78)
Ln(total assets) -0.23*** -0.25*** -0.21*** 0.00*** -0.02*** 0.01***
 (-33.59) (-16.29) (-24.95) (15.16) (-13.22) (11.56)
Sales growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
 (1.45) (1.04) (0.72) (17.89) (7.18) (17.82)
Intercept 6.43*** 7.51*** 5.87*** -0.17*** 0.14*** -0.16***
 (44.51) (21.57) (28.38) (-15.78) (5.56) (-10.08)
R-squared 0.16 0.44 0.13 0.17 0.42 0.17
Adj R-squared 0.16 0.35 0.13 0.17 0.33 0.17
 
 
 
Table 9 takes Tobin’s q as dependent variable and there are two more independent 
variables than in Table 8 which is ROA and the interaction effect of ROA and family 
dummy. The interaction effect variable is formed by multiplying a dummy variable 
(family dummy) ROA. This variable equals ROA for family firms and zero for non-
family firms. This interaction term is then included in the regression predictors. OLS 
regression, firm fixed effects regression, and 2SLS regression are performed. 
Coefficients of other independent variables are more or less the same with the results 
table 8 shows. The interaction of ROA and family dummy is negatively related with 
the q value (-0.71, -0.39, -1.59) and the results are also statistically significant,  
suggesting that, relative to listed family firms on Chinese stock market, ROA and 
Tobin’s q also have negative relation.  
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Table 9: Regression Results 2 
Regression results of Tobin’s q on family ownership, ownership concentration, 
interaction of ROA and family dummy and other Corporate Governance variables. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1%(***), 5%(**), or 10%(*) level, 
respectively. 
 Tobin's q 
  OLS Fixed Effects 2SLS 
  
Family ownership dummy 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.45***
 (4.55) (2.49) (4.93)
Ownership concentration -0.90*** -1.93*** -0.78***
 (-15.71) (-17.96) (-11.84)
Restraint of ownership concentration -0.06*** -0.21*** -0.08***
 (-4.44) (-8.24) (-5.46)
Shareholding of CEO 0.72** 0.30 0.77*
 (2.36) (0.57) (2.47)
Shareholding of board -0,98*** -3,15*** -1,34***
 (-4,25) (-5,54) (-5,35)
Shareholding of board chair 1.26*** 3.76*** 1.07***
 (3.80) (3.79) (3.13)
Board size 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02***
 (3.44) (6.44) (5.29)
Duality 0.01 0.03 0.02
 (0.57) (1.11) (0.81)
Debt to equit ratio 0.00 -0.00 0.00
 (0.21) (-0.98) (0.15)
Ln(total assets) -0.23*** -0.26*** -0.21***
 (-35.90) (-17.57) (-26.55)
Sales grwoth 0.02* 0.01 0.01 
 (1.69) (1.29) (0.74)
ROA 0.20* 0.31** 0.52***
 (1.65) (2.31) (3.54)
ROA*family dummy -0.71*** -0.39*** -1.59***
 (-3.13) (-1.66) (-5.07)
Intercept 6.45*** 7.58*** 5.85***
 (46.46) (22.59) (29.11)
R-squared 0.16 0.42 0.12
Adj R-squared 0.16 0.33 0.12
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Table 10 represents the results of firm fixed effects regression, trying to find out the 
relation between Corporate Governance influence and shareholder value in family and 
non-family firms. In column 1, consistent with earlier empirical research, we pool all 
firms in our sample. 
Columns 2 and 3 present the regression results when delineating the sample based on 
the type of  ultimate controller of companies disclosed since 2007. Column 2 shows 
the results with family firms and Column 3 with non-family firms.  
Ownership concentration and restraint of ownership concentration in family firms 
bears more negative significant relation to shareholder value than in non-family firms 
(-2.54, -1.62; -0.36, -0.16), likely because of the insider expropriation in family firms. 
Shareholding of CEO has positive coefficient for family firms (1.81) while negative 
for non-family firms (-1.57), suggesting firm value increases as the shareholding of 
CEO increases in family firm, but decreases in non-family firms. It seems that stock 
incentives for CEO have positive influence on q in family-controlled firms but not in 
non-family firms.  In contrast, the coefficient of shareholding of board is negative in 
family firms (-3.41) but positive in non-family firms (1.09). However the influence of 
shareholding of board to Tobin’s q in non-family firms is not significant. 
The coefficient estimates on shareholding of board chair in family and non-family 
firms are both positive (3.51, 0.54) though in non-family firms not significant. The 
influence of shareholding of board chair to firm value in family firms is much greater 
than that in non-family firms. Since the CEO and board chair in family firms are 
probably just the members of the family, and regression results shows that the 
shareholding of CEO and board chair both have greater effects on firm performance in 
family firms compared with non-family firms, it suggests that the executive stock 
incentives have  greater positive impact for family members in family firms. 
The relations between board size and Tobin’s q in family and non-family firms are 
opposite. Board size has positive relation to firm value in non-family firms (0.03) but 
negative relation in family firms (-0.01).   
Duality of board chair and CEO has no significant relation to Tobin’s q both in family 
and non-family firms. 
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Table 10: Regression Results 3 
Regression results of Tobin’s q on family ownership, ownership concentration and 
other Corporate Governance variables, using sub samples of family firms and non-
family firms. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1%(***), 5%(**), or 
10%(*) level, respectively. 
 Tobin's q 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 all firms family firms non-family firms 
Family ownership dummy 0.06*** - - 
 (2.55) - - 
Ownership concentration -1.86*** -2.54*** -1.62***
 (-17.67 (-7.08) (-14.86)
Restraint of ownership concentration -0.21*** -0.36*** -0.16***
 (-8.50) (-5.43) (-5.64)
Shareholding of CEO 0.30 1.81** -1.57***
 (0.52) (2.18) (-8.36)
Shareholding of board -2.95*** -3.41*** 1.09
 (-5.31) (-4.26) (0.43)
Shareholding of board chair 3.59*** 3.51*** 0.54
 (3.70) (2.46) (0.08)
Board size 0.02*** -0.01*** 0.03***
 (7.16) (-0.85) (7.88)
Duality 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 (1.18) (0.33) (1.10)
Debt to equity ratio -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.04***
 (-4.92) (-3.97) (-5.21)
Ln(total assets) -0.21*** -0.43*** -0.15***
 (-13.72) (-9.20) (-9.21)
Sales growth 0.01 -0.02 0.02*
 (1.54) (-0.99) (1.91)
Intercept 6.51*** 1.18*** 5.04***
 (18.93) (11.71) (13.85)
R-squared 0.43 0.50 0.48
Adj R-squared 0.34 0.32 0.39
 
 
To check the impact of Corporate Governance on firm performance in different 
industries, I select three types of industries, which are financial and technology 
firms(GICS 40,45), energy and material firms(GICS 10,15) and industrial firms(GICS 
20), the regression results are displayed in Table 11. 
For these three industry types, the family dummy has no significant relation to firm 
performance, but the impacts of ownership concentration are all significantly negative 
to q in these three industries (-1.52, -1.31, -1.96). The coefficients of shareholding of 
 - 53 - 
CEO are all positive (1.79, 2.42, 2.95) while those of shareholding of board are all 
negative (-1.81, -4.33, -2.78). In financial and technology firms the shareholding of 
board chair has negative relation with firm value (-7.22) while in the other two 
industry areas this kind of influence are positive (4.76, 2.01). Board size has slightly 
positive influence on firm value (0.01, 0.01, 0.01). 
 
 
Table 11: Regression Results 4  
Regression results of Tobin’s q on family ownership, ownership concentration and 
other Corporate Governance variables, using sub samples of financial and 
technology firms, energy and material firms and industrial firms. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at 1%(***), 5%(**), or 10%(*) level, respectively. 
 Tobin's q 
  
Financial and 
technology 
firms 
Energy and 
material firms 
Industrial firms 
  
Family ownership dummy 0.09 -0.02 0.08 
 (1.45) (-0.38) (1.37)
Ownership concentration -1.52*** -1.31*** -1.96***
 (-4.75) (-6.85) (-7.62)
Restraint of ownership concentration -0.10 0.00 -0.24***
 (-1.47) (0.09) (-4.14)
Shareholding of CEO 1.79* 2.42** 2.95*
 (1.83) (2.14) (1.45)
Shareholding of board -1.81* -4.33*** -2.78**
 (-1.71) (-2.55) (-2.20)
Shareholding of board chair -7.22*** 4.76** 2.01
 （-1.58） (1.96) (0.86)
Board size 0.01* 0.01** 0.01*
 (1.51) (2.09) (1.68)
Duality -0.09* -0.08* 0.06 
 (-1.56） (-1.69) (1.13)
Debt to equity ratio -0.00 -0.00 0.00
 (-0.32) (-0.69) (0.66)
Ln(total assets) -0.61*** -0.23*** -0.28***
 (-16.58) (-8.01) (-8.90)
Sales growth 0.02 -0.01 0.06***
 (1.16) (-0.56) (2.81)
Intercept 1.49*** 6.60*** 8.09***
 (0.83) (9.99) (11.10)
R-squared 0.54 0.43 0.49
Adj R-squared 0.44 0.32 0.38
Number of Observations 1919 2642 2594
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Table 12 presents the regression results using sub samples of family intensive 
industries, and other industries. Family intensive industries are those that family firms 
take more than the average percent in Table 6, meaning that industries in which 
family firms take over and equal to 19% are family intensive industries the rest are 
other industries. 
For family intensive industries, family ownership have greater and significant 
influence on q (0.08). Interestingly, the coefficients of ownership concentration and 
restraint of ownership concentration on q for family intensive industries and other 
industries are quite different. Ownership concentration in family intensive industries 
has positive impact (2.33) on q and negative influence (-1.56) on q for other industries 
suggesting that for these family intensive industries, the shareholding of the largest 
shareholder has positive and significant impact on firm performance while this 
statement doesn’t hold for those industries in which family firms don’t play an 
important role.  
Concerning the impact of restraint of ownership concentration on firm performance, 
in family intensive industries, this variable has negative coefficient (-0.32), while in 
other industries positive (0.11). That means for family intensive industries, it’s better 
to have less restraint on ownership concentration and for other industries, restraint of 
ownership concentration is good for firm performance. 
The coefficients of shareholding of board are both negative for family intensive 
industries and other industries (-2.87, -2.99). On the contrary, the coefficients of 
shareholding of board chair are both positive (2.88, 3.09). And the board size of 
family intensive industries has greater positive impact on q than that of other 
industries (0.17, 0.02). 
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Table 12: Regression Results 5 
Regression results of Tobin’s q on family ownership, ownership concentration and 
other Corporate Governance variables, using sub samples of family intensive 
industries, and other industries. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1%(***), 
5%(**), or 10%(*) level, respectively. 
 Tobin's q 
  
Family intensive 
industries
Other industries 
  
Family ownership dummy 0.08** 0.05
 (1.93) (1.30)
Ownership concentration -2.33*** -1.56***
 (-12.25) (-12.08)
Restraint of ownership concentration -0.32*** -0.11***
 (-7.78) (-3.17)
Shareholding of CEO -0.30 1.99**
 (-0.38) (1.96)
Shareholding of board -2.87*** -2.99***
 (-3.91) (-2.78)
Shareholding of board chair 2.88* 3.09**
 (1.60) (1.92)
Board size 0.17*** 0.02***
 (2.67) (5.16)
Duality 0.05 -0.01
 (1.36) (0.17)
Debt to equity ratio -0.05*** -0.05***
 (-4.77) (-5.42)
Ln(total assets) -0.43*** -0.13***
 (-15.79) (-6.70)
Sales growth 0.01 0.01 
 (0.76) (-0.66)
Intercept 1.14*** 4.62***
 (19.18) (10.60)
R-squared 0.46 0.49 
Adj R-squared 0.35 0.40 
Number of Observations 5029 6603 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
This study surveys the dataset which comprises a panel of 13553 firm-year 
observations during the period of 1998-2008, and the other panel of 15396 firm-year 
observations of financial sheets from 1994-2008. These two panel data represent 1575 
A-share firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in China.  
 
Results from the descriptive statistics show that family firms’ Tobin’s q value is 
higher than non-family firms’ but the situation is opposite if ROA is taken as the firm 
performance measure. And ownership concentration in non-family firms – mostly 
state-owned companies – is 12% higher than in family firms.  
The regression results are also very different when Tobin’s q and ROA are dependent 
variables.  Taking q as firm performance metric, family ownership has a positive and 
significant effect on performance, but there is negative and significant correlation 
between ownership concentration – represented by the shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder – and performance. In contrast, if ROA is the dependent variable, family 
ownership has a slightly negative impact on this performance measure and ownership 
concentration positively affects ROA.  
Concerning managerial ownership, in family firms, the shareholding ratio of the CEO 
is positively related to Tobin’s q, but negatively related to ROA, so is the 
shareholding of board chair.  
The duality of CEO and board chair has no significant relation to performance, just 
like most of the literature shows. 
 
Using two more explanatory variables which are ROA and the product of ROA and 
family dummy variable, the regression to q is performed in order to find the 
interaction effect of ROA and family dummy on q. The interaction is negatively 
related with Tobin’ q and the results are also statistically significant, suggesting that, 
relative to listed family firms on Chinese stock market, ROA and Tobin’s q also have 
negative relation.  
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Using sub-samples of family firms and non-family firms, I also regress Tobin’s q on 
Corporate Governance variables and find that ownership concentration and restraint 
of ownership concentration in family firms bears more significant negative relation to 
q than in non-family firms, likely because of the insider expropriation in family firms. 
Regression results also show that the shareholding of CEO and board chair both have 
greater effects on firm performance in family firms compared with non-family firms, 
which suggests that the executive stock incentives have greater positive impact for 
family members in family firms. 
Board size has positive relation to firm value in non-family firms but negative relation 
in family firms and the duality of board chair and CEO has no significant relation to 
Tobin’s q both in family and non-family firms. 
 
To check the impact of Corporate Governance on firm performance in different 
industries, two regression are performed. Firstly I select three types of industries, 
which are financial and technology firms(GICS 40,45), energy and material 
firms(GICS 10,15) and industrial firms(GICS 20) and compare the coefficients. 
Secondly, industries are divided into two groups, which are family intensive industries, 
which are industries in which family firms take over and equal to 19%, and the rest of 
industries. 
For these three industry types, the family dummy has no significant relation to firm 
performance, but the impacts of ownership concentration are all significantly negative 
to q in these three industries, showing the entrenchment effects in these three types of 
industries. The coefficients of shareholding of CEO are all positive while those of 
shareholding of board are all negative. To be noticed is in financial and technology 
firms the shareholding of board chair has negative relation with firm value while in 
other two industries this influence is positive. 
For family intensive industries, family ownership have greater and significant 
influence on q. Ownership concentration in family intensive industries has positive 
impact on q and negative influence on q for other industries, suggesting that for these 
family intensive industries, the shareholding of the largest shareholder has positive 
and significant impact on firm performance while this statement cannot hold for those 
industries in which family firms don’t play an important role.  
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The coefficients of shareholding of board are both negative for family intensive 
industries and other industries. On the contrary, the coefficients of shareholding of 
board chair are both positive.  
 
From this study we can see that the ownership of state-owned firms on Chinese stock 
markets are highly concentrated and these firms still play the roll as economic giants 
in China. On the other side, family firms grow fast from 1998 to 2008, and share more 
stocks with management compared with state-owned firms.  
Regressing Tobin’s q, the results show that the ownership concentration isn’t 
beneficial, indicating the entrenchment effect of ownership concentration on firm 
performance. This kind of negative influence is even more obvious in family firms, 
likely because of the insider expropriation. Concerning the impact of managerial stock 
incentives on firm performance, regression results reveal that the shareholding of 
CEO and board chair both have greater effects on firm performance in family firms 
compared with non-family firms, which suggests that the equity-based compensation 
have  greater positive impact for family members in family firms since CEO and 
board chair of family firms are probably just family members.  
Regarding to the industry effects on firm performance, we find for family intensive 
industries, the shareholding of the largest shareholder has positive and significant 
impact on firm performance while this statement cannot hold for those industries in 
which the proportion of family firms is below the average.  
 
All in all, Corporate Governance is a precondition of any modern financial market 
where the base is credibility and confidence; without such a base, it would be difficult 
for China’s market to attract and gain the trust of both domestic and international 
investors. 
However, Corporate Governance in China is still in an embryonic stage, and there are 
plenty of problems to be solved, as show in the empirical analysis, like low efficiency 
due to highly concentrated ownership in state-owned firms, entrenchment effect of 
ownership concentration and insider expropriation in family-firms. It calls for 
Corporate Governance reforms building up an environment where the elements of a 
well functioning financial market (e.g. well-defined legal system, efficient regulatory 
agencies, rigorous law enforcement) are in place. 
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Anhang I 
 
Zusammenfassung 
  
Diese Arbeit untersucht die Situation der Corporate Governance in China und 
versucht die Beziehung zwischen der Corporate Governance und der 
Unternehmensperformance der öffentlich gelisteten Unternehmen der Chinesischen 
Börsenmärkte zu analysieren. Diese hier gesammelten Daten beinhalten eine Liste 
von 13553 firm-year observations von Corporate Governance im Zeitraum von 1998-
2008 und eine Liste von 15396 firm-year observations von financial sheets im 
Zeitraum von 1994-2008. Diese beiden Listen repräsentieren 1575 A-share 
Unternehmen der Shanghai und Shenzhen Börsenplätze in China. 
  
Durch diese Arbeit wir ersichtlich, dass das Eigentum der staatlichen Unternehmen 
am Chinesischen Börsenmarkt sehr hoch ist und dass diese Unternehmen noch immer 
eine große Rolle als wirtschaftliche Giganten in China spielen. Jedoch befinden sich 
im Zeitraum von 1998-2008 die Familienunternehmen im schnellen Wachstum und 
beteiligen sich mehr an Aktien mit Management als staatliche Unternehmen. 
Die Ergebnisse des Regressing Tobin’s q zeigen, dass sich die Konzentration an 
Eigentum nicht positiv auswirkt, was auf einen entrenchment effect der Konzentration 
von Eigentum auf die Unternehmensperformance hinweist. Diese negativen 
Auswirkungen machen sich noch stärker in Familienunternehmen erkennbar, 
höchstwahrscheinlich durch Enteignung von Familienmitgliedern. 
Hinsichtlich des Einflusses der Aktienmotivation für Manager auf die 
Unternehmensperformance lässt sich sagen, dass die Regressionsergebnisse darauf 
hinweisen, dass das shareholding von CEO und Vorstandsvorsitz größere 
Auswirkungen auf die Unternehmensperformance in Familienunternehmen zu haben 
scheinen, als dies in nicht durch eine Familie geführten Unternehmen der Fall ist. Dies 
deutet auf einen größeren positiven Effekt der equity basierenden Entlohnung für 
Familienmitglieder innerhalb von Familienunternehmen hin, da CEO und 
Vorstandsvorsitz der Familienunternehmen höchstwahrscheinlich nur durch 
Familienmitglieder besetzt werden.  
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Die Auswirkungen der Industrie auf die Unternehmensperformance betreffend lässt 
sich feststellen, dass in einer Familien starken Industrie das shareholding des größten 
shareholders einen positiven und signifikanten Einfluss auf die 
Unternehmensperformance hat, während diese Aussage nicht auf eine Industrie 
zutrifft, in der das Verhältnis der Familienunternehmen unter dem Durchschnitt liegt. 
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